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DILUTION BY BLURRING UNDER THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995:
WHAT IS IT AND HOW IS IT SHOWN?
Terry Ahearn*
"[Ilf you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, and Rolls Royce
cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy,
in 10 years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark
anymore. )I
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (FTDA). The FTDA was designed to provide uniform
national protection to the value of trademarks and replace
the "patch quilt system" of state laws that had produced
inconsistent and unenforceable results.! However, dilution
theory has never been unanimously accepted as a viable
extension of traditional trademark protection,' and asprevious failed legislation5 and state court experience has
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 41. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Fordhamn University.
1. Hearings on H.R. 11,592 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong.
15 (1932) (statement of Frank I. Schechter, professor of law who is credited with
introducing dilution theory to the United States in his 1927 article, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, which was published in the Harvard
Law Review in 1927). See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. II 1996)).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995). In pointing out that, at the
time, only 25 states had dilution laws on the books, the report stated, "[a]
federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used
on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a
patch-quilt system of protection." Id.
4. See generally Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling
Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789
(1997) (criticizing dilution theory in general and discussing the historical
judicial record of noncompliance with dilution statutes).
5. See H.R. 11,592, 72d Cong. (1932) (bill drafted by Frank I. Schechter
and intended to protect federally-registered marks against dilution failed to
pass); see also S. 1883, 100th Cong. (1988); H.R. 5372, 100th Cong. (1988).
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shown,' the application of dilution theory is intensely debated
and begrudgingly applied.7 Much of the controversy, if not
all, surrounds the primary prong of dilution law, "blurring."
Blurring encompasses the traditional or original form of
dilution that focuses on the "whittling away" of a trademark's
distinctiveness by a subsequent user of the same or similar
mark.8 Blurring under the FTDA suffers from the same
problems that have plagued dilution theory from its origins,
and case law under the FTDA has produced similarly
incoherent and inconsistent results.9
This comment focuses on the dilution by blurring cause of
action under the FTDA by looking at two circuit court cases
that represent the disparate interpretations made under the
Act."° From there the comment will suggest the approach to
which the Act is most susceptible and argue how that
proposition can be enforced.
First, the comment gives a general overview of dilution
theory and dilution by blurring." Next, the comment
describes the development of dilution from its early origins as
a theoretical critique of traditional trademark law," through
its development under state law,3 to the culmination of
dilution law in the FTDA.'4 The comment then looks at two
circuit court opinions that produced two different approaches
to the blurring problem, then argues which of those two
rulings should be adopted" under an amendment to the
"Discomfort with the dilution provision stemmed ostensibly from concerns about
how trademark dilution would interact with the First Amendment." Klieger,
supra note 4, at 833.
6. See generally Klieger, supra note 4, at 795-833.
7. See id.
8. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 24:68, 24:94 (4th ed. 1997); see also Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927)
(referring to the legal protection against "the gradual whittling away ... of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark").
9. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
discussion infra Part II.E. 1-2 (analyzing Ringling Bros. and Nabisco).
10. See supra note 9.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part II.C.
14. See discussion infra Part II.D.
15. See discussion infra Part II.E.1-2.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
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FTDA.17
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the difficulty the federal courts
have had in interpreting and applying the dilution by
blurring cause of action, it is important to understand the
long and convoluted history of dilution law from its early
theoretical origins to its place as a "well-entrenched"18 federal
cause of action.
A. "Where the Likelihood of Confusion Test Leaves Off, the
Dilution Theory Begins"19
Dilution theory has two goals: first, "to eliminate any
'risk of an erosion of the public's identification of a very
strong mark with the plaintiff alone,."'20 and second, "to
prevent another user from 'diminishing a mark's
distinctiveness, uniqueness, effectiveness, and prestigious
connotations."'' = The term "dilution" refers to a diminishment
in the ability of a distinctive or famous trademark to identify
and distinguish goods and services carrying that mark, even
where an ordinary consumer could not think that the junior
(the subsequent user) and senior (the first or prior user) users
of the mark were somehow related or connected."
Unlike the traditional objective of trademark protection,23
17. See discussion infra Part V.
18. Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 264 (1999).
19. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:70.
20. Oswald, supra note 18, at 260 & n.21 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc.
v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 797 (S.D. Tex. 1996)).
21. Id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:71.
22. See generally Schechter, supra note 8.
23. See generally Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427
(1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129) [hereinafter Lanham
Act]. For a basic understanding of the likelihood-of-confusion standard, section
43(a) of the Lanham Act provides, in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
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dilution does not focus on the protection of consumers from
confusion, but upon protection of the strong identification
value of the trademark. 4 Some examples of marks that
would dilute a famous trademark are MICROSOFT rugs,
STARBUCKS boats, and GAP dental floss. 5 Furthermore,
dilution theory does not apply only to competing goods and
services, as is generally the case with traditional trademark
law, rather, dilution is widely viewed as applying to both
competitive and noncompetitive goods alike.2" Finally, the
key purpose of the dilution cause of action is to protect a
mark's strong distinctiveness.27 Therefore, if a mark has not
acquired sufficient distinctiveness under either a state
statute or the federal act, then dilution law does not protect
it.2
8
Dilution by blurring is the classic form of dilution
encompassed by the original definition of dilution as the
"diminishment of the distinctive quality"29 of a mark or the
"whittling away" ° of the value of a mark."' Dilution by
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall
be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (regarding the
likelihood of confusion standard for registered marks).
24. See Schechter, supra note 8; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:71(discussing the difference between the likelihood-of-confusion standard and
dilution).
25. See also Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir.
1998) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:68 (pointing out that the Dilution
Act was created to protect trademark owners of non-competing uses such as
DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos)).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. II 1996) (relevant text quoted infra note 77).
27. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (requiring the mark to be both "distinctive"
and "famous") (full text quoted supra note 77); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1)(a) (1995) (requiring the mark to be "highly
distinctive").
29. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:71.
30. Schechter, supra note 8, at 821.
31. The courts generally recognize two forms of dilution: "tarnishment" and
"blurring." See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F. Supp. 605, 614 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("Although the Act
does not specifically mention either [blurring or tarnishment], both are
appropriate elucidations of the dilution concept given that both were
contemplated by the Act's drafters and are consistent with the Act's purpose.");
Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)(maintaining that a likelihood-of-dilution can be established by a showing of
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blurring occurs when a sufficiently distinctive mark is used in
connection with the goods or services of another.32 Although
buyers are not confused as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or connection," consumers will, over time, come to
see the senior mark as being associated with several
products, none of which belong to the senior user." These
subsequent uses thus erode the ability of the mark to "evoke
among prospective purchasers a positive response that is
associated exclusively with the goods or services of the
trademark owner.
35
B. Frank Schechter and Dilution as the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection"6
The origins of American dilution law trace back to a 1927
law review article by Professor Frank Schechter in which he
wrote, "the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark
should constitute the only rational basis for its protection."37
What Professor Schechter described in 1927 would later
become known as the concept of dilution." He went on to
characterize the harm to be prevented under his theory as:
The gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its
use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive or
unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public
consciousness, and the greater its need for protection
against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
either tarnishment or blurring); H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995) ("The
purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses
that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.");
MCCARTHY, supra note 8, §§ 24:68, 24:69 (discussing the two most common
types of dilution, blurring and tarnishment, and pointing out the recent
addition of a third type, cybersquatting).
32. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, §§ 24:68, 24:94.
33. See id. § 24:68.
34. See id. § 24:94.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
36. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 796 (citing Schechter, supra note 8, at 831).
37. Id.
38. The term "dilution" and the theory of dilution as a form of trademark
protection apparently originated in British and German courts. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 8, § 24:67 (citing Charles Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark
Dilution and the Anti-dilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REV. 439, 448 (1956)); see
also Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
108, 109-11 (1993) (discussing the early history of dilution theory).
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product in connection with which it has been used.39
In light of advances in trade and the rapid growth of the
economy, Schechter attempted to move away from the
traditional likelihood of consumer confusion rationale as the
basis for trademark protection.4 °  Schechter recognized
another aspect of trademarks that, in his view, the consumer
confusion test largely ignored.4' Namely, Schechter saw
trademarks not only as indicators of source and quality,
purposes typically advanced under the trademark laws of
that time, but also saw in the marks "an agency for the actual
creation and perpetuation" of that source and quality.42
Schechter believed that a trademark's selling power
relates directly to its uniqueness as a mark, and that a firm
that invests thousands of dollars developing a mark should
not have to stand idly by while other users strip the mark of
its commercial magnetism,4" regardless of the effect on
consumer welfare.44 He believed that trademark law ignored
the fact that a mark is "not merely [a] symbol of good will but
often [is] the most effective agent for the creation of [that]
good will." 5 As such, this selling power required absolute
protection of the mark's uniqueness.46
C. State Dilution Laws: Protection against the "Cancer-Like
Growth" of Dissimilar Products Feeding upon Distinctive
Trademarks47
In the two decades following Schechter's proposal,
dilution theory caught on slowly. In fact, between 1933 and
1977 only one case effectively applied the dilution theory.48 In
39. Schechter, supra note 8, at 825.
40. An in-depth analysis of the contrasting features of the confusion cause of
action and the dilution cause of action is beyond the scope of this comment. For
an excellent comparison of these two concepts see MCCARTHY, supra note 8, §
24:70, and Klieger, supra note 4, at 791-95.
41. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 796 (citing Schechter, supra note 8, at 818).
42. Id.
43. See id.; see also Mishakawa Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. KresgeCo., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (coining the term "commercial magnetism" as a
proper characterization of what Schechter meant).
44. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 796.
45. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 8, at 830).
46. See id.
47. See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977).
48. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 266 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid,
Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963)).
[Vol. 41
DILUTION BY BLURRING
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.,"9 the Seventh Circuit held
that the use of the "POLARAID" mark on heating and
refrigeration products diluted the use of the "POLAROID"
mark on camera products. °  In 1932 Schechter himself
proposed federal legislation but Congress failed to adopt his
proposal or to make dilution a part of the 1946 Lanham Act.51
However, cases surfaced where the courts, at least
implicitly, applied Schechter's theory. For example, in
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 2 the defendant
used a logo of a diamond with light radiating from it and the
name "Tiffany," while the plaintiff had been using the same
name for its jewelry company for years.53  The court
characterized the injury to the plaintiff as "the gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods."54  This language was identical to the
language used in Schechter's 1927 article.5 However, the
court ultimately found for the plaintiff under a likelihood of
confusion analysis, the traditional trademark infringement
test.
16
Despite the failures of proposed federal legislation57 and
of the judiciary to completely embrace dilution theory,58
dilution law, nonetheless, began to develop at the state level.
In 1947, Massachusetts enacted the first dilution statute.5"
Today, over half the states have either a dilution statute or
include dilution as part of their common law.6" Most of these
49. Polaroid Corp., 319 F.2d 830.
50. See id.
51. H.R. 11,592, 72d Cong. 15 (1932). The bill, intended to protect federally-
registered marks against dilution, failed to pass. See id.
52. 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
53. See id. at 460-61.
54. Id. at 462.
55. See Schechter, supra note 8, at 825.
56. See Tiffany & Co., 264 N.Y.S. at 462.
57. See supra note 5.
58. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
59. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 300 n.58 (citing Act of May 2, 1947, ch.
307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
ll0B, § 12 (1996))).
60. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 300 n.59 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-12-17
(1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (MICHIE 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113
(Michie 1996); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330(a) (West 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 35-11(C) (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA.
STAT. ch. 495.151 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-
513 (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1035/15 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §
8992001]
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statutes protect a well-known mark from use by others even
in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.6
Notwithstanding the proliferation of state dilution
statutes and early indications of a judicial affinity for dilution
theory," courts proved reluctant, if not hostile, to apply the
state dilution statutes. As one commentator remarked,
between the years 1933 and 1977 only one case effectively
applied a state statute.63 Another commentator pointed out
that, among other reasons beyond the scope of this comment,
the courts were hostile to state dilution statutes because of
the difficulty the courts had in defining dilution and the
standards for determining when dilution had occurred."'
In 1977, the state "dilution logjam"5 was broken. In
Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.,"
although the court held that the plaintiffs mark was not
distinctive and thus not subject to protection from dilution,
the court acknowledged a need for the protection of a mark
against the "cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or
548.113 (West 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.110B, § 12 (1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.165 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (Supp.1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 30-13-334 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney Supp.1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1995); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West
1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODEANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West
Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-13 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie1997)). In addition, Colorado, Michigan, and Ohio apparently include dilution
as part of their common law. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 300 n.59 (citing
cases that have followed the common law approach).
61. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 300 n.60 ("Most state statutes are
modeled after the dilution provision found in the 1964 version of the Model
State Trademark Bill, which states in relevant part:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid
at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be aground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services.
Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (U.S. Trademark Ass'n 1964).").
62. See supra notes 52, 58 and accompanying text.
63. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 266.
64. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 798.
65. See Oswald, supra note 18.
66. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
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services which feeds upon the business reputation of an
established trademark... beyond that provided by actions for
infringement."" Following Allied Maintenance, most courts
began to apply the state dilution statutes although most of
the dilution claims in this period simply added to the
traditional trademark infringement, or likelihood of
confusion, claim.68 Indeed, in only sixteen cases from 1977 to
1996 did the courts grant relief solely on dilution grounds.69
Nonetheless, courts took dilution more seriously with "'more
decisional ink ... [being] devoted to dilution [in the years
following Allied] than [in] the previous fifty.'
70
D. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Fixing the
"Patchwork Quilt of Dissimilar Laws"71
Notwithstanding the affirmative application of dilution
theory under state law,72 the use of state dilution laws
without a federal dilution cause of action led to several
problems. First, despite the increased use of the state laws,
the courts still seemed reluctant to apply them independently
of traditional trademark infringement claims.3 Second, the
lack of uniformity in state laws encouraged forum shopping
as parties sought out states that had dilution statutes.74
Third, the "patch quilt system 75 of state laws inadequately
provided extraterritorial protection to trademarks that were
used on a national scale in a state that did not have a dilution
statute although the markholder had an injunction issued by
a state that did.6
As a result of these concerns Congress passed the Federal
67. Id. at 1165.
68. See Kieger, supra note 4, at 820 n.173 (pointing out Sally Gee, Inc. v.
Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160 (11th Cir. 1982)).
69. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 820 n.174 (citing cases applying dilution
with a traditional infringement claim only).
70. Id. at 820 (quoting Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the
Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK
REP. 289 (1984)).
71. Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995: You've Come A Long Way Baby - Too Far Maybe?, 39 S.
TEX. L. REV. 133, 141 (1997).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
75. Id.
76. See Duffey, supra note 71, at 141.
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Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA) which President
Clinton signed into law on January 16, 1996."7 The FTDA
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. II 1996); Trademark (Lanham) Act of
1946, ch. 540, §§ 43(c)(1), 45, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1129):
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with
the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark
is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading area and
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person
against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on
the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such
willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be
entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the
discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with
respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the
common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of
the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a common mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and commentary.
For purposes of the Lanham Act "[tihe term 'dilution' means the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of:
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or
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amended section 43 and section 45 of the Lanham Act of
19468 to provide protection for famous marks from
subsequent uses that blur, tarnish, or disparage the
distinctiveness of the mark, without regard to and even in the
absence of likelihood of confusion.79 The FTDA provides
protection by creating a federal cause of action for the
protection of famous marks from users that "attempt to trade
upon the goodwill and established renown" of the mark and,
thus, dilute its distinctive quality."
The FTDA also serves an important purpose of
trademark legislation that the Lanham Act initially failed to
cover, even though the legislature recognized the purpose in
1946 when the Act was first passed. As the legislative history
of the 1946 version of the Lanham Act demonstrates,
trademark legislation has two purposes." The first is to
protect consumers from confusion as to the source and quality
of the goods or services upon which the mark is placed.82 This
purpose is easily satisfied where two products are similar or
related. The second purpose of trademark legislation is to
protect the owner of a trademark who has spent time, energy,
and money in the pursuit of the first purpose from those who
would trade upon the mark's goodwill.83 However, where the
goods or services are unrelated, the confusion test is hard to
meet even though the marks are similar. The FTDA is
designed to serve this purpose.84
Section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act85 now provides, in
relevant part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to
the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
deems reasonable, to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
78. See supra notes 23, 77.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
80. See id. at 3.
81. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
82. See id.; see also Duffey, supra note 71, at 138.
83. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3; see also Duffey, supra note 71, at 138.
84. See supra note 77.
85. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109
Stat. 985, 985 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. II 1996)).
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mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this
subsection.88
Section 45 of the Lanham Act87 now provides, in relevant part,
"The term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."88
In order to establish a prima facie claim of dilution under
the FTDA, the plaintiff must plead and prove the following:
(1) plaintiffs mark is famous; (2) defendant is making
commercial use of the same or similar mark in interstate
commerce; (3) defendant's use began after plaintiffs mark
became famous; and (4) defendant's use causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark.89 The FTDA defines dilution
as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence
or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous
mark and other parties, or; (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception."
90
As one commentator wrote, "[t]he passage of the federal
Dilution Act has further cemented the doctrine within
trademark law .... As a practical matter, dilution theory is
so well-entrenched within both state and federal law that the
only relevant question is how best to apply the theory.""
E. Blurring the Blurring Doctrine under the FTDA: The
Circuits Speak
Although the FTDA does not specifically mention
"blurring," the Act defines "dilution" in terms typically
characteristic of blurring. 2 Furthermore, the legislative
history of the FTDA indicates that Congress intended the
statute to cover all forms of dilution, primarily blurring:"
"[t]he purpose of [the FTDA] is to protect famous trademarks
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. II 1996).
87. Federal Trademark Dilution Act § 4.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. II 1996).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
90. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
91. Oswald, supra note 18, at 264.
92. The statute defines dilution in terms traditionally used to describe
blurring. See supra notes 28-30, 77 and accompanying text.
93. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
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from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the
mark.""' However, the FTDA and the cases decided under it
have done little to demonstrate "how best to apply the
[blurring] theory."95 Indeed, the application of the FTDA in
the federal courts has produced incoherent definitions of
blurring and this "muddling... has flowed through directly
to the manner in which dilution can be proved, leading to
erroneous tests and questionable outcomes."96 The following
cases illustrate this point.
1. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development97
Ringling brought a federal trademark dilution claim
against the state of Utah for its use of the mark, "The
Greatest Snow On Earth," for its winter sports tourism
industry, which Ringling claimed diluted its mark, "The
Greatest Show on Earth."98 The district court ruled in favor of
the state of Utah rejecting Ringling's definition of dilution by
blurring and its subsequent method of proving that
definition. 9 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
basic holding and sought to clarify the requirements for
dilution by blurring under the FTDA."
The Fourth Circuit began with a lengthy discussion of
the history of dilution theory emphasizing the state courts'
interpretations of state dilution statutes, 101 interpretations
that the court held demonstrated "the sheer difficulty that
courts have had in getting a firm handle on the basic concept
of 'dilution."' 2 The court then pointed out two "key
provisions" of the FTDA that, in its opinion, demonstrate the
required showing for dilution.' First, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the language of the FTDA-"another person's
94. Id.
95. Oswald, supra note 18, at 280.
96. Id. at 283.
97. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999).
98. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997).
99. See id.
100. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d 449. For the remainder of this comment I
use the words "dilution" and "blurring" interchangeably. See supra note 92.
101. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454-58.
102. Id. at 455.
103. See id. at 458.
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use... causes dilution""'0 -expressly states that the Act only
protects against "actual, consummated dilution" vis-A-vis
"likelihood of dilution," which most state statutes protect. °5
Second, the court found that the definition of dilution in the
FTDA-"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services" °6-" makes
plain ... that the end harm at which [the FTDA] is aimed is a
mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such."1 7 In
light of this admittedly "stringent" interpretation of the
FTDA,'06 the court found that proof of federal dilution by
blurring requires: (1) a sufficient similarity of marks to evoke
in consumers a mental connection of the two marks; (2) The
similarity must cause actual harm to the senior mark's
economic value, or selling power, as an identifying and
advertising agent of the product.'9
While recognizing the difficulty plaintiffs would have
meeting this standard, the Fourth Circuit suggested three
possible ways of showing actual economic harm. ° First, but
"most rarely," the senior user could show actual loss of
revenue and that the junior user was the cause of that loss."'
Second, and "most obviously," the senior user could use
"skillfully constructed consumer [surveys] designed not just to
demonstrate 'mental association' of the marks in isolation,
but further consumer impressions from which actual harm
and cause might rationally be inferred."' Lastly, the court
suggested that a set of "contextual factors" might be relevant
to support a showing of actual harm."' However, the court
specifically rejected the so-called "Mead factors""4 as a proper
test for actual dilution."5
The Second Circuit in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
105. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458; see supra note 61 (standard
language of a typical state act).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
107. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
108. See id. at 458-59.
109. See id. at 459.
110. See id. at 464.
112. See id. at 465.
112. See id.
113. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 463.
114. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
115. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465.
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Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc."' suggested a standard for
determining when dilution by blurring exists.117  In a
concurring opinion, Judge Sweet developed a six-factor
"blurring" test for determining likelihood of dilution:
similarity of the marks, similarity of the products,
sophistication of the consumers, predatory intent, renown of
the senior mark, and renown of the junior mark.1 Although
still used in some state court cases, judges and commentators
have largely discredited the test for being too similar to the
tests used for determining likelihood of confusion in
traditional trademark infringement cases."9
The Ringling Bros. court recognized the prevalence and
"obvious utility" of Judge Sweet's test in state dilution cases
where the standard for protection was "likelihood of dilution,"
but agreed with most courts and commentators 2 ° that the
Mead factors were inappropriate under the federal act. 1
Instead, the Fourth Circuit suggested that certain Mead
factors such as the junior mark's exposure, the similarity of
the marks, and the strength of the senior mark as evidence
that might "complement other proof."'22
2. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 23
The appeal in this case arose out of a counter-claim of
trademark dilution by blurring brought by the manufacturer
of "Goldfish" cheese crackers, Pepperidge Farms, against the
manufacturer of "CatDog" cheese crackers, Nabisco, Inc. The
case involved the latter's use of a similarly fish-shaped cheese
cracker.2 4 The district court ruled in favor of Pepperidge
Farms granting a preliminary injunction against Nabisco for
116. 875 F.2d at 1026.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1032-39.
119. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 463-64 (rejecting the Mead factors);
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227 n.8 (2d Cir. 1999) (voicing
trepidation about applying the Mead factors but equally declining to overturn
its present case); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:94.1 (finding four of the
five factors irrelevant); Oswald, supra note 18, at 285 (finding only "similarity of
the marks" relevant).
120. See supra note 119.
121. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464.
122. Id. at 465.
123. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
124. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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dilution by blurring under the FTDA."' The Second Circuit
affirmed the lower court's basic holding with modifications to
the applicable standard of review in a federal dilution by
blurring cause of action.12
The court began its analysis by reviewing the text of the
FTDA 7 and the definition of dilution by blurring under the
Act. "' 8 From this analysis, the court determined that five
elements are necessary to establish a claim of dilution under
the FTDA. They are: (1) the senior mark must be famous; (2)
it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be in interstate
commerce; (4) the use must begin after the senior user's mark
has become famous; and (5) the junior use must cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.29
The fifth element - the junior's use must cause dilution
of the distinctive quality of the mark - was the "key
operative element" of the FTDA, according to the district
court.130 The court then found that the effect of a distinctive
and famous mark is its selling power and that the purpose of
the FTDA rests upon this proposition.' However, the selling
power of a mark, the district court noted, derives its strength
from the "mark's uniqueness and singularity,"32 and that an
unauthorized use of the mark reduces "the public's perception
that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or
particular.""3 When this loss of distinctiveness happens, the
court concluded, the "selling power that a distinctive mark...
has engendered for a product in the mind of the consuming
public" is diminished.14 In short, the court defined "dilution"
as a loss of distinctiveness and the protection of that
distinctiveness from harm by another's use."'
To determine whether a junior's use of the same or
similar mark has caused dilution of the senior mark, the
125. See id.
126. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208.
127. See supra note 77 (text of the FTDA).
128. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 214-15; see also supra note 77 (defining dilution
under the FTDA).
129. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
130. See id. at 217.
131. See id.
132. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 8, at 831).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.104-374, at 3 (1995)).
135. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
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district court adopted a "cautious and gradual approach."136
That is, just as it had done for cases involving traditional
trademark infringement claims,"' the court suggested that
based on the facts of each case, courts should, or could,
develop another list of "nonexclusive" factors that could assist
them in determining whether a mark has suffered a loss of
distinctiveness.38
The Nabisco court analyzed the dilution claim under the
following factors: (1) distinctiveness of the senior mark; (2)
similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products and
likelihood of bridging the gap; (4) interrelationship of the
previous three factors; (5) whether or not the senior and
junior user share consumers and geographic limitations; (6)
sophistication of consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8)
adjectival or referential quality of the junior use; (9) harm to
the junior user and delay by the senior user; and (10) effect of
the senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark.' From all
these factors, the court concluded that there was a likelihood
that Nabisco's use would dilute Pepperidge Farm's senior
mark. 141
The district court proceeded to hold that the lower court's
application of the so-called Mead factors14 ' was not
appropriate in this case and that courts should not
automatically apply these factors. 42 Pointing out that Judge
Sweet's Mead factors lacked important elements for
determining dilution, such as actual confusion, likelihood of
confusion, shared consumers, and geographic isolation-
elements the Nabisco court included in its list-the court
concluded that the best approach to this new cause of action
would be for courts to "feel their way from case to case,
setting forth in each those factors that seem to bear on the
136. Id.
137. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
This Second Circuit case produced the so-called Polaroid factors for determining
whether or not a junior mark is likely to confuse. See id. The factors are:
strength of the plaintiffs mark, similarity between the two marks, similarity of
the products, likelihood that plaintiff will enter into defendant's market, actual
confusion, defendant's lack of good faith, quality of the defendant's product, and
sophistication of the buyers. See id. at 495.
138. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
139. See id. at 217-22.
140. See id.
141. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
142. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 226, 227 n.8.
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resolution of that case, and, only eventually to arrive at a
consensus of relevant factors on the basis of this accumulated
experience."'"
Finally, the Nabisco court addressed the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Ringling Bros.44 and rejected its interpretation of
the FTDA which required proof of actual dilution.4 ' First, the
court called the requirement that the senior user show actual
loss of revenue "inappropriate."' Under this definition of
dilution "the senior user might never be able to show
diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the
junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior [mark] ."'4
This difficulty existed, the court argued, because a
successfully exploited senior mark might never actually lose
revenue. Further, even if the plaintiff could actually prove its
loss, that loss could be the result of some other circumstance
besides the junior's use.14  Second, the court found that
"skillfully constructed consumer survey[s]" are "expensive,
time-consuming, and not immune to manipulation."
1
'
Instead, the court suggested that "contextual factors" be used
to prove dilution because they have "long been used to
establish infringement," and they allow for logical inferences
of injury to be drawn sufficiently to satisfy a dilution claim.5 °
Finally, the court noted that although support exists in the
FTDA for the Fourth Circuit's reading, the Act, by its own
language, requires a showing of actual dilution. 5' The court
held that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation depends upon
"excessive literalism" and that it seems plausible that when
Congress provided for an injunction, it intended to prevent
the harm before it occurs.'
143. Id. at 227.
144. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
145. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24 (disagreeing with the holding in
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999)).
146. See id. at 223.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 224.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996). "The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled . . .to an injunction . . .if such use causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark." Id.
152. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUE
The preceding background illustrates that the dilution by
blurring cases under the FTDA have produced inconsistent
definitions of both what dilution by blurring is, and
subsequently, how those definitions should be proven."'
Consequently, this muddled approach to the FTDA highlights
the need for a consensus on how best to apply the dilution by
blurring cause of action that is consistent with the spirit and
purpose of dilution theory and with Congress's intent in
enacting trademark dilution by blurring as federal law.
As far back as 1927 Professor Frank Schechter identified
the need for legislation to deal with the problem that became
known as dilution by blurring of a senior user's trademark.'
From about the same time, however, legislatures and courts
have been reticent to apply the concept of dilution as it has
arisen through proposed federal legislation 5' and under state
law.' Congress intended the FTDA5 7 to address this
problem on a national level, creating a uniform approach to
the dilution cause of action.' The FTDA has failed to fulfill
this mandate, and as the case law illustrates, the dilution by
blurring cause of action remains as "muddled" 9 as when
Congress first passed the Act.
Schechter's initial concerns still exist, as do the harms
that the Lanham Act of 1946 sought to avoid.6 ' Furthermore,
inconsistent and unreliable outcomes cause extreme harm to
a senior user who has made a large investment into a
trademark. Such confusion can also be devastating to a
junior user who makes a substantial investment into a
trademark that they subsequently may not use.' Further,
inconsistent and unreliable outcomes can lead to forum
shopping, which was a major concern in moving away from
153. See discussion supra Part II.E.1-2.
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.
155. See supra note 5 (discussing two failed pieces of federal dilution
legislation).
156. See Klieger, supra note 4, at 798 (pointing out the judicial hesitation, if
not agitation, to apply the state dilution laws).
157. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (Supp. II. 1996) (relevant text quoted at
note 78).
158. See discussion supra Part II.D.
159. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 280.
160. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
161. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999).
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"patchwork quilt" state laws to the FTDA.'62 Ultimately,
Congress needs to reconcile these concerns with the
inconsistent and harmful results coming out of the circuit
courts.'63
This comment suggests a uniform approach by
addressing two fundamental questions at the source of the
inconsistent rulings in the federal circuits. First, what is
dilution by blurring: a loss of the selling power of the
trademark164  or the loss of the distinctiveness of the
trademark?. 5 Second, does the FTDA require the senior user
to show actual harm'66 or likelihood of harm?67 The following
section addresses these concerns.
IV. ANALYSIS: DEFINING DILUTION BY BLURRING
The FTDA amended the 1946 Lanham Act. 68  The
amendment provided important trademark protection that
the Lanham Act had failed to provide although the Act's
legislative history reveals Congress's intent to provide such
protection.'69 Little doubt exists, however, that the language
of the FTDA is largely to blame for the difficulties the circuit
courts are having in applying the dilution by blurring cause of
action. 7 ° In light of the first twenty years of disagreement
over the validity of dilution theory and the subsequent fifty
years of inconsistent state law,'7' it is no surprise that
Congress did not get it right. However, this is not to say that
there is not sufficient case law, '72 legislative history,'73 and
academic commentary 74 that suggests a definition for dilution
by blurring and how best to apply it in a uniform way.
As noted above, the second purpose of the 1946 Lanham
162. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
163. See discussion supra Part II.E.1-2.
164. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999).
165. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
166. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
167. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24.
168. See supra note 77 (text of the FTDA).
169. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
170. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
171. See supra Part II.A-D.
172. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208.
173. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995).
174. See Oswald, supra note 18.
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Act was to protect the owner of a trademark who has spent
time, energy, and money on establishing the mark from those
who would trade upon the goodwill or value of that mark.'75
Subsequently, Congress passed the FTDA to provide
protection to senior users from junior users that "cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of [their] mark."'76
Somewhat circularly, the FTDA defined "dilution" as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services."'77 That is, the FTDA provided
protection from the lessening of the capacity (dilution) to
identify and distinguish (distinctiveness). Similarly,
"blurring" refers to the loss of the "unique and distinctive"
significance of a trademark, and it is correctly understood to
be synonymous with the original concept of dilution.'78
From these confusingly similar definitions inconsistent
outcomes arise as courts try to interpret what the FTDA
means and what the parties have to show to garner its
protection. 9
A. Loss of Selling Power or Loss of Distinctiveness
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the FTDA in
Ringling Bros. when it defined dilution by blurring as the loss
of a mark's selling power.'8 ° On the other hand, the Second
Circuit in Nabisco correctly defined dilution by blurring as
the loss of a mark's distinctiveness. The Second Circuit's
definition is the proper interpretation of the FTDA in light of
the history of dilution theory."'
In Ringling Bros., the Fourth Circuit found that the
definition of dilution under the FTDA - "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services'' 82 - "makes plain... that the end harm at which
[the FTDA] is aimed is a mark's selling power, not its
175. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946); see also supra Part II.D.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996) (full text quoted at note 78).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. II 1996) (full text quoted at note 78).
178. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:68.
179. See supra Part II.E.1-2.
180. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999).
181. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. II 1996).
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'distinctiveness' as such."183 In Nabisco, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the effect of a distinctive and famous
mark is its selling power and that the purpose of the FTDA
rests upon this proposition. 84 However, the court argued that
the selling power of a mark derives its power from the
"mark's uniqueness and singularity" 1' and that an
unauthorized use of the mark reduces "the public's perception
that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or
particular."88 Therefore, while the Second Circuit recognized
that protection of the selling power of a mark is the ultimate
purpose of dilution law, the only way to protect that power is
to first protect the trademark's distinctiveness.'87
The Ringling Bros. court correctly held that "the end
harm at which [the FTDAI is aimed is a mark's selling
power.""8 However, rather than focusing on the loss of that
power as the standard of proof of dilution by blurring, the
Nabisco court correctly stated (and Schechter himself
believed) that protection of the selling power "required
absolute protection of the mark's uniqueness."'89
Indeed, the legislative history of the FTDA supports this
contention. 9 ° Nowhere does the legislative history of the
FTDA mention a mark's "selling power." In defining the
purpose of the legislation, Congress characterized the harm to
be prevented as the protection of "famous trademarks from
subsequent users that blur the distinctiveness of the mark." 9'
The legislative history refers to a mark's selling power when
it addresses a junior user's attempt to "trade upon the
goodwill and established renown" 9 of a mark but does so only
to illustrate an important point that has permeated dilution
theory since its introduction. Namely, Schechter realized
that the "stimulant effect" of a distinctive mark was its
potential as a "powerful selling tool."'93 Once a mark has lost
183. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
184. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
185. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 8, at 831).
186. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)).
187. See id.
188. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
189. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217; see also Schechter, supra note 8, at 831.
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995).
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 3.
193. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995)); Schechter, supra note 8, at 831.
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its distinctiveness it has already begun to lose its selling
power."' So, if one waits for a loss of selling power (either
actual or likely) the mark cannot recover from its injury
because it will have lost its public perception as signifying
something "unique, singular, or particular."'95 Therefore, to
protect the selling power of the mark, the mark's
distinctiveness must first be protected.
B. Actual Harm or Likelihood of Harm
As one commentator wrote, except for the Fourth
Circuit in Ringling Bros., "no other court has articulated [the]
requirement of proof that the second comer's trademark need
cause actual harm to the famous mark."196 Although courts
could read the FTDA to require actual harm to the senior
user's mark,' case law and commentary unanimously agree
that actual harm is not required and that a likelihood of harm
is the appropriate standard.9
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that an "actual
harm" standard would be difficult to prove, the court
nonetheless argued that the language of the FTDA-"another
person's use ... causes dilution"-expressly states that the
Act only protects against "actual, consummated dilution" and,
therefore, requires a showing of actual harm.'99 The Second
Circuit in Nabisco rejected this interpretation of the FTDA. °°
In that case, the court found the requirement that the senior
user show actual loss of revenue to be "inappropriate.""' As
the court explained, under this definition of dilution "the
senior user might never be able to show diminished revenues,
194. See Schechter, supra note 8, at 831.
195. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
196. Steven B. Polotilow, Is Evidence of Actual Harm or Confusion Required
to Establish Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal Dilution Act? 99, 107 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 558, 1999) (providing an analysis of the debate over the actual harm
standard).
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996) (providing relief "if such use
... causes dilution").
198. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224; MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:90 n.17
(finding that the likelihood of harm standard "is the correct reading of the
statute and more in accord with traditional anti-dilution law").
199. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458-64 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999).
200. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223.
201. See id.
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no matter how obvious it was that the junior use diluted the
distinctiveness of the senior [mark]. " "°' This was true, the
court found, because a successfully exploited senior mark
might never actually lose revenue, or conversely, if actual loss
could be shown, that loss could be the result of some other
circumstance besides the junior's use.0 3 The court argued
that although there is support in the FTDA for the Fourth
Circuit's reading that the Act requires actual dilution,"4 this
interpretation depends upon "excessive literalism" and, more
significantly, it seems plausible to the court that what
Congress meant by providing for an injunction was to prevent
the harm before it occurs.0 5
The Fourth Circuit's disparate position is not without
foundation in the FTDA, which provides protection from use
that "causes dilution."0 6 However, the Fourth Circuit itself
recognized the difficulty in requiring such proof.0 7 Indeed,
the Second Circuit acknowledged the plausibility of the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation.2 ' The Second Circuit also
thought that this interpretation depended upon "excessive
literalism" and failed to recognize that by providing for an
injunctive remedy, Congress understood the statute to
prevent the harm before it occurs.0 9
In his influential treatise, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy
acknowledged that courts could read the FTDA two possible
ways but argued that the likelihood of harm standard stood
"more in accord with traditional anti-dilution law."2 1 0
McCarthy went on to argue that "[the FTDA] does not require
proof of an actual lessening of the strength of the famous
mark: only that there is a lessening of the capacity or ability
of the mark to be strong as a commercial symbol and
identifier." 1  For McCarthy this includes even "small and
202. Id.
203. See id. at 224.
204. See id. (pointing out "that the language of the [FTDA] gives some
support to this reading, in that it uses the formulation, 'causes dilution").
205. See id.
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 (Supp. II 1996).
207. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458-64 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999).
208. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
209. See id.
210. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 24:90 n.17.
211. Id. § 24:94.
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insignificant" use, because "if one small user can blur the
sharp focus of the famous mark to uniquely signify one
source, then another and another small user can and will do
SO.1
2 12
Even the chief critic of dilution theory admitted that
despite the language of the FTDA, Congress could not have
intended to require proof of actual harm.213 As that critic
correctly pointed out, an actual harm standard would erect
"an impenetrable barrier to any federal dilution action"214
because "the very premise of dilution is that no single junior
user sufficiently undermines the distinctiveness and selling
power of a mark to be objectively identified or measured.""'
As the case law, legislative history, and academic
commentary under the FTDA demonstrates, strong support
exists for a uniform approach to the federal dilution by
blurring cause of action that recognizes the likelihood of loss
of distinctiveness as its standard of proof.
V. PROPOSAL
Two years ago Congress passed the Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999.216 This new amendment to the
Lanham Act provides trademark holders with the right to
oppose, or to move for cancellation of, a mark before the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB).217  The
legislative history to these new amendments recognizes that
since enactment of the FTDA, the "federal courts have
grappled with how to apply the statute." 8  However,
Congress failed to clarify the ambiguities that led to the split
in the circuit courts. Instead, Congress argued that
resolution of these problems would be dealt with in a more
"timely, economical, and expeditious" manner before the
TTAB.2 11 Yet, Congress failed to realize that in those cases
that do appear before the TTAB, the TTAB will face the same
interpretative issues based on the same case law, legislative
212. Id.
213. See Kieger, supra note 4, at 837.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (Supp. II 1999)).
217. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 4 (1999).
218. Id. at 5.
219. Id.
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history, and academic commentary that the federal circuits
have faced. And, as we have seen, that plethora of
commentary and analysis is subject to multiple
interpretations. ° Indeed, some interpretations are more
apparent than others,"' but no guarantee exists that the
decisions before the TTAB, while more uniform, will provide
the most justice for the parties involved.
As the 1999 and the 1995 amendments demonstrate,
Congress is willing to address the problems that confront the
courts in trying to provide the best possible trademark
protection. In this same spirit and consistent with the Second
Circuit's ruling in Nabisco, Congress needs to once again
amend the Lanham Act to clarify the issues discussed above.
First, Congress should amend section 43(c)(1) of the Act to
read ". . . if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes [or is likely to cause] dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark."2 Second, Congress should
amend section 45 to redefine "dilution," in terms consistent
with Schecter's original proposal, as "the lessening of the
mark's [distinctive capacity to act as a powerful selling
tool] ,
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress recognized that the protection of a trademark's
value was an essential purpose of trademark law when it first
enacted federal trademark legislation more than fifty years
ago.22' After years of debate on whether a trademark was
entitled to such protection, the idea that a trademark should
be free from dilution was firmly accepted . 2" However, what
that protection would include and how dilution would be
proven ignited yet another battle. 6
The FTDA provides an opportunity for a uniform
approach applicable to all marks in a consistent and coherent
manner. Although the FTDA has failed to live up to its
potential and has, itself, produced inconsistent standards and
220. See supra Part II.
221. See supra Part IV.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
224. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129).
225. See supra Part II.B-D.
226. See supra Part II.E.
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dissimilar results, it is still in the early stages of its
development and is not yet a failed piece of legislation.
Indeed, much of the divergent interpretation can be
reconciled by an amendment to the FTDA expressly adopting
a uniform standard that clearly follows from the history of
dilution theory and that has been successfully applied in the
federal courts.

